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Beyond economic sustainability: embedding social and environmental values 






The transition of global financial markets towards investment models that 
incorporate environmental and social dimensions is now well underway. This 
paper discusses the evolution of contemporary responsible investment (RI) and 
its relationship to sustainable development and environmental social governance 
(ESG). In the conception of ESG presented here, various well-known 
institutional arrangements, most notably interest representation, accountability 
and transparency, decision-making, and implementation are linked to the 
structures and processes of governance. Using a hierarchical framework of 
principles, criteria and indicators (PC&I), the paper presents a means for 
evaluating RI by way of an analysis of stakeholder perceptions regarding the 
sector’s governance quality. It concludes with some observations on the 




Since the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED – 1992), 
sustainable development has been promoted through a range of global public-
private initiatives, including the Global Compact (2000). UNCED played a 
central role in the development and promotion voluntary methods of 
environmental problem solving as an alternative to governmental regulation 
(Clapp 2005). These are implemented through a range of private sector, market-
based mechanisms such as emissions trading and eco-labelling (Jordan et al 
2005; Falkner 2003) whereby a range of actors, state, civic and business have 	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come together in a series of multi-scalar, multi-stakeholder initiatives (MSIs), 
“conducive to inclusive development” (Utting and Marques 2010, p. 17). 
In 1999, the World Bank and the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) co-founded the Global Corporate Governance Forum 
(GCGF) as a facility of the International Finance Corporation (IFC). The aim of 
the Forum is to encourage companies to invest, and behave, in a socially 
responsible manner (GCGF 2010). Between 2003 and 2005 the United Nations 
Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEP FI) engaged in a process 
with the UN Global Compact and investment industry representatives to develop 
a set of principles for responsible investment (PRI) (Global Compact and UNEP 
FI 2009a). The PRI initiative is aimed at integrating ESG issues into financial 
management (Global Compact and UNEP FI 2009b). These cover elements 
required for reporting on environmental and social performance, referred to as 
sustainability reporting (UNEP FI 2009e). Sustainability reporting functions 
within a context of transparency about economic, environmental, and social 
impacts and is a “fundamental component in effective stakeholder relations, 
investment decisions, and other market relations” (GRI 2008, p. 1). These 
elements were identified and developed between 2003 and 2005 in collaboration 
with the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), and building on the 2002 social 
performance indicators of SPI Finance. Environmental reporting concerns a 
number of elements, including materials, energy, water, biodiversity, emissions, 
compliance and transport. Social reporting covers four sub-themes: labour and 
work practices, human rights, society, and product responsibility. Economic 
reporting is also included and concerns such issues as financial performance, 
market presence, indirect economic impacts, and investment in the community. 
Each of these activities is reported against a series of performance indicators 
(GRI 2008). Such initiatives are to be understood as examples of ‘soft’ law, 
based around  “aspirational voluntary declarations of intent” (UNEP FI 2009d). 
Here, compliance occurs in the context of self-regulation against standards, 
which concern such areas of corporate activity as accountability, responsibility 
and implementation (Clapp 2005).  
As a financial sector, RI is governed by a plethora of initiatives that have 
arisen in the absence of any formal global system. There are a variety of models 
 3	  
 
to determine social and environmental sustainability and there is clearly a need 
for some level of consolidation (Waddock 2008). Despite the proliferation of 
such systems of private environmental governance, there are no consistent rules 
or standards to guide them (Whitman 2005). The problem of competing 
approaches to evaluating sustainability is evident in the RI sector. In the case of 
screening for example, there is an evolving debate over which method is 
preferable: some companies use negative screens (no alcohol, tobacco, firearms); 
others screen positively (best-in-class); others simply on the basis of the degree 
to which a company engages and involves multi-stakeholders (UNEP FI and 
Mercer 2007). The result is that there is uncertainty regarding the legitimacy of 
both the evaluation methods being used and the entities being evaluated.  
 
Analytical perspective 
In view of the developments discussed above, this paper conceives ‘stakeholders’ 
as a group of diverse interests that collectively shape the institutions in which 
they interact, allowing for a more integrative conception than allowed for in 
more strictly neo-utilitarian theory. MSIs are also made up of a wide range of 
actors, from civil society to more traditional interests, which inter-subjectively 
shape and share ideas about institutional structures and processes. Such 
developments require new approaches to evaluating the frameworks through 
which governance is legitimated. On this view, universal ownership is extended 
to include interests traditionally seen as peripheral to business practice. By 
understanding governance as being founded on stakeholder engagement in the 
broadest possible sense, responsibility can be evaluated in environmental and 
social as well as economic terms, resulting in a transition away from traditional 
practices of corporate governance. This allows for a more ethical, and less 
functionalist model for determining governance quality (Ruggie 1998). 
Traditional economic preferences for maximising shareholder returns are now 
being increasingly supplemented by broader concerns about ESG (Hawley and 
Williams 2005).  
Contemporary ESG can be traced back to the recognition that modern 
corporate governance consists of “mechanisms to reach collective decisions 
about transnational problems with or without government participation” (Haufler 
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2001, p. 1). Rather than looking solely at the imposition of various externalities 
on global or regional economies by corporations, it is also possible to look at the 
external imposition of a range of obligations/pressures on corporations by 
transnational advocacy groups, or networks including NGOs (Keck and Sikkink 
1998). These have led to corporate responses that have resulted in a ‘greening 
up’ of transnational corporations and financial institutions, such as the World 
Bank (Haufler 1999; Park 2007). RI consequently reflects the trends found 
across the field of sustainable development whereby non-government 
organisations (NGOs), stakeholders and other market-based actors are interacting 
within governance systems that have a wider focus than those found in 
traditional ‘top-down’ institutions. This more collaborative approach generates 
new partnerships between businesses, NGOs and governments, and creates new 
services and products (GGCF and IFC undated). It is now possible to speak of a 
‘new corporate governance’, which reflects the norms of contemporary 
governance theory including an orientation around such environmentally and 
socially-oriented values (Hilb 2009).  
Four main issue areas impinge on the growing understanding of contemporary 
governance. The foremost without doubt concerns responsible organisational 
behaviour (or corporate social responsibility), usually understood in terms of 
accountability and transparency (Garten 1999; Hawley and Williams 2005; 
Detomasi 2006; Waddock 2008; UNGC and GCGF 2009). A second and almost 
equally significant area of concern is around the representation of different 
stakeholder interests within a given institution. Here the discussion is largely 
about issues of inclusiveness and equality, particularly whether all interests enjoy 
the same levels of access and weight as economic interests, and similar degrees 
of institutional or technical capacity to participate effectively (Jänicke 1992; 
Stiglitz 2003; Kerwer 2006; Koenig-Archibugi 2006; GGCF and IFC undated). 
A third concern is centred upon decision-making, notably the presence or 
absence of institutional democracy, methods by which agreements are reached, 
and how disputes are settled; in the case of corporate governance, such issues as 
having a ‘say on pay’ are especially relevant. (Ostrom 1990; van Vliet 1993; 
Jänicke 1996; Meidinger 2006, Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009). The fourth major 
preoccupation is the manner in which policies, programmes or standards are 
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implemented. In the domain of sustainability, effective implementation has been 
identified as relating to both the behavioural- and problem solving abilities of an 
institution (Skjærseth et al 2006). In the context of RI, behavioural change would 
refer specifically to changing behaviour around financial market activities that 
result in environmentally and socially unsustainable outcomes. The problem RI 
is seeking to address is the negative externalities associated with unsustainable 
investment (e.g. deforestation). Given the inherently dynamic nature of the 
ecological systems (and related markets), such institutions also need to be 
resilient in the face of changing external circumstances, such as climate change, 
or market conditions. Non-resilient systems are unlikely to remain durable in the 
light of such changes (Folke et al 2005). Durability in the context of RI would 
refer to long-term investment practices that are based on environmentally and 
socially sustainable practices. 
These various governance arrangements can be brought together into a 
hierarchically consistent framework of principles, criteria and indicators (PC&I), 
which allows for the evaluation of RI as a mechanism of sustainable 
development. The relationship between principles, criteria and indicators, and 
how the various elements discussed above can be formulated for assessing the 
governance quality of RI, are laid out in Table 1 below. A principle is a 
fundamental rule, perspective, or value, which serves as a basis for determining 
the function of a complete system in respect to explicit elements. Criteria 
function at the next level down, and can be described as categories of conditions 
or processes, which contribute to the overall principle. They are intended to 
facilitate the assessment of principles that would otherwise be ideational and 
non-measurable. Criteria are not usually capable of being measured directly, but 
are formulated to provide a determination on levels of compliance. They are 
consequently linked to indicators, which are hierarchically lower, and which 
represent quantitative or qualitative parameters that relate to the relevant 
criterion Together, PC&I may be used as the basis for standards, which serve as 
a reference for monitoring, reporting and evaluation. (Lammerts van Beuren and 
Blom 1997). Standards determine how the substantive outcomes of a given 
system are formulated and applied, thereby delivering effectiveness and 
legitimacy (Kooiman 1993). 
 6	  
 




responsibility	   Transparency	  
Inclusiveness	  
















Source: Cadman 2009 (adapted) 
 
Methodology 
Using the analytical perspective outlined above, a survey of stakeholders 
associated with RI was developed to provide some insight into attitudes 
concerning the governance quality of RI amongst some of the participants in the 
sector. In late 2009-early 2010 the author contacted various institutions, which 
were invited to fill in an anonymous survey asking them to rate the governance 
quality of the RI sector, on the basis of the eleven indicators of Table 1.2 A wide 
range of stakeholders was invited to participate from across the RI constellation. 
Selected target groups comprised academia, awards and prizes, listed companies, 
conferences and events, financial institutions, governmental organisations 
(national, regional and international), indices, media, NGOs, professional 
associations, public private partnerships, rating agencies, and researchers. One 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The author wishes to acknowledge Dr Enrico Bernardini, portfolio analyst at the Risk 
Management Department of Banca d'Italia, for his invaluable assistance in compiling the 
database of target organisations. 
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the basis of who responded, and in order to make analysis tractable, survey 
participants were broken down into six groups: fund managers, financial planners 
and advisers, RI programmes, NGOs and researchers; sole respondents were 
grouped under ‘other’ (bank, ethical shareholder, higher education, private 
investor, third party, responsible investment association). Table two lists the 
type, response count and number of survey participants.  
Table 2: RI survey list of participants 
Type Number  Percent 
Fund manager 7 25% 
Financial planner and/or 
adviser 
5 17.9% 
RI programme  4 14.3% 
NGO 3 10.7% 
Researcher 3 10.7% 
Other (Bank, Ethical 
shareholder, Higher 
education, Private investor, 
Third party, Responsible 
investment association) 
6 21.4% 
Total 28 100 
 
Participants were asked by means of the Internet tool SurveyMonkey 
(www.surveymonkey.com) to rate each of the 11 indicators listed in Table 1 
above, using a Likert scale from ‘very high’ to ‘very low’. A ‘don’t know’ option 
of zero value was also provided; it is noted that this results in some statistical 
bias towards participants who expressed a preference. Questions were weighted 
to produce an average rating by group. The Table below presents a breakdown of 
results by group as well as an overall average across groups. This average figure 
allows for the aggregation of indicator scores at the criterion level and thus 
producing a total score, or ‘consensus rating’ across participants of the extent to 
which the principle of environmentally and socially sustainable investment is 
met by the RI sector.  
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Table 3: Responsible investment governance survey – participants’ evaluation by 
criterion and associated indicators 
 
Highest possible score: 15 
Average score: 9.03 
 
Highest possible score: 10 






Indicator  Inclusiveness Equality Resources Accountability Transparency  
Fund manager 3.14 2.86 3.67 3.00 3.43  
Financial 
planner/adviser 
3.20 2.50 3.67 3.40 3.40  
RI programme 3.75 3.50 3.75 3.75 3.75  
NGO 3.33 2.67 3.00 3.33 3.67  
Researcher 3.33 1.67 2.00 2.00 2.33  
Other 3.17 2.80 2.25 3.00 2.83  
Average 3.32 2.66 3.05 3.08 3.23  
 
Highest possible score: 15 
Average score: 10.02 
 
Highest possible score: 15 













Fund manager 3.33 3.60 3.60 3.43 3.29 4.00  
Financial 
planner/adviser 
3.67 3.67 3.50 3.80 3.40 4.00  
RI programme  3.25 3.50 3.75 3.75 3.00 3.75  
NGO 3.00 3.00 3.00 3.33 3.00 3.67  
Researcher 3.00 3.50 3.00 3.00 3.33 3.33  
Other 3.33 3.00 3.50 3.60 3.50 3.17  
Average 3.26 3.37 3.39 3.48 3.25 3.61  
Rating 
(out of 55) 
      35.70 
 
Discussion 
Given the small number of respondents (28), and the preponderance of 
Australians and New Zealanders (16) the study should be seen as largely 
anecdotal and merely indicative of some of the viewpoints within the sector, 
rather than being in any way broadly representative or authoritative. 
Nevertheless, it reveals some interesting perspectives. Overall, participant 
attitudes were generally favourable. With a rating of 35.7 or 65%, it could be 
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said that the RI sector was perceived to have a creditable degree of compliance 
with the principle of environmentally and social sustainable investment. This 
would imply that there was a degree of confidence amongst survey participants 
in the structures and processes of governance across the sector. Below is a 
discussion, based on participants’ comments, of some of the most salient features 
of the survey. 
At the criterion level, interest representation performed relatively well, with a 
score of 9.03, or 60%. Both of the lowest scoring of all the indicators – equality 
at 2.66 and resources at 3.05, placing them both in the ‘medium’ band – are 
located under this criterion, however. In the case of equality, RI might be 
reflecting trends across corporate governance for domination by controlling 
interests and/or majority shareholders (Bebchuk and Hamdani 2009). As one 
survey participant bluntly commented, “Nobody treats all interests equally, and 
nobody should”. This sentiment is also reflected in a comment made by a fund 
manager regarding the democracy of RI, which is worth inserting at this point:  
It is difficult to achieve democracy in RI systems, as they need to ensure 
a consistent process is followed. I don't think that democracy is a 
significant issue for RI investors. They only want to ensure that their 
money is being managed in a manner consistent to how they were told it 
would be managed.  
While these observations may be true for certain controlling interests, major fund 
managers or other influential actors, this perspective might not sit well with 
stakeholders more peripheral to the institutional centres, but affected by its 
activities, such as Indigenous People, or local communities. The availability, or 
provision of resources (technical, institutional, financial) to participate in RI was 
the second weakest indicator at 3.05. Researchers selected ‘low’, whilst fund 
managers, financial planners and RI programme all selected ‘high’. Here it might 
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be concluded that these interests, located as they are at the centre of RI, would 
have the necessary infrastructure to participate effectively in RI. An individual 
private investor, or third party, by contrast, might not. One researcher expressed 
the view that RI programmes tended to be “resource starved”; this was especially 
the case for “dedicated” ones (defined elsewhere by the another respondent as 
“genuine ethical and sustainable fund managers”). Whether this is a comment on 
the level of resources provided to RI programmes within existing financial 
institutions, or on the difficulty for independent, more stringent RI programmes 
to attract the necessary support, or both, is unclear.  
Mitigating these indicators is inclusiveness, which achieved a score of 3.32. 
Most respondents selected medium (16) or high (7), reflecting a general view 
that programmes tried to be inclusive, at least in terms of the different market 
contexts in which RI could be applied. They were less sure about how much this 
aligned with what the “people on the street” wanted. Other negative comments 
included concerns about the narrowness of focus, including an overemphasis on 
the use of “outdated” methods such as negative screening, or restricted 
definitions of sustainability, which overly concentrated on governance risks. 
With an overall score of 6.31, or 63%, the criterion of organisational 
responsibility achieved an acceptable, but not particularly inspiring, result. What 
is perhaps more alarming is the relatively low score for accountability (3.08); 
fund managers as a group scored it even lower (3.00). One made the comment 
that although investors wanted to be “part of the dialogue about the RI 
investment process” they often had to deal with fund managers who were often 
part of large, conservative and mainstream banks, which were not particularly 
responsive to these demands. Consequently, fund managers tended to keep 
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information to themselves, and this had knock-on transparency-related effects. 
As a result, these kinds of RI programme neither comprehensively disclosed their 
investment methodologies about the actual investments made, nor the reasons 
behind each investment. This was creating a sense of mistrust in the public. One 
researcher commented that they did not think a whole lot of attention was paid to 
accountability in the RI sector, and efforts at improvement had not gone very far. 
They expressed the view that the RI sector did not appear to perceive low levels 
of accountability as “major issue for the field, or at least a major barrier to 
expansion and mainstreaming”. Another researcher felt that there needed to be 
more accountability and monitoring of RI activity of institutions, so that 
investors could make clearer distinctions between those fund managers that were 
genuinely committed to RI and those that just paid it lip service. In this regard 
UNPRI needed more enforcement capacity. This comparatively low evaluation 
of such a core attribute of ESG is worrying, even if it is anecdotal. 
Comments regarding the criterion of decision making – the individual 
indicator of democracy notwithstanding – were generally positive, resulting in an 
overall score of 10.2 or 68%. Most respondents selected ‘high’ or ‘medium’ for 
all three indicators, but there was a significant proportion, which selected ‘don’t 
know’, making it difficult to say that the scores in the Table 3 are particularly 
representative of survey participants. Whether this reflects a lack of knowledge, 
or interest, in these aspects of RI governance is unknown. One fund manager felt 
that “most decision making processes [were] fundamentally sound - in terms of 
being a good process to make consistent decisions”. Participants who commented 
about democracy, reflecting the trends in corporate governance noted above, 
sought to qualify the institutional expression of democracy in RI in some way. 
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One financial planner commented that: “No business enterprise can be operated 
in a totally democratic way and prosper as a business. But to the extent that RI 
institutions welcome and consider input from various constituent groups, I would 
rate them high”. One researcher didn’t see democracy as being “relevant to most 
firm structures, which engage employees fairly well in this space, but are not 
cooperatives etc.”. In terms of how agreements were made in the sector, another 
researcher made the comment that “people get to consensus pretty well in the RI 
space”. No survey participants commented on dispute settlement in RI; this had 
the highest level of ‘don’t know’ answers of any question in the survey (46%). 
Again, however, most opted for ‘medium’ (7) or ‘high’; two selected ‘very high’, 
and one ‘low’.  
With a score of 10.34 or 69%, implementation was the (marginally) highest 
scoring criterion. The highest scoring indicators were located here: durability, at 
3.61 and behaviour change, at 3.48. This would appear to indicate that survey 
participants were mostly optimistic about the resilience of RI, and its capacity to 
change investment behaviour now and into the future. In terms of durability, 
most respondents (16) would probably agree with the comment from one of the 
NGO representatives that RI was “experiencing strong and consistent growth”, 
although one researcher felt that the jury was still out over the future of the 
sector. One fund manager commented that RI would “be a lasting trend in the 
mainstream wealth management industry - if only because it addresses business 
risks and opportunities such as climate	  change”. The most detailed responses in 
the survey were made concerning RI’s influence on behaviour change. One NGO 
response sums up these sentiments: 
There is considerable anecdotal evidence that serious shareholder 
engagement programmes of the likes of Hermes, F&C and Regnan and 
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others do indeed improve corporate behaviour… Also, whose behaviour 
is important to change? The investors, or the actual companies causing 
the damage? Changing investor behaviour in terms of ‘considering’ ESG 
factors is irrelevant if it does not send signals to the companies causing 
the damage on the ground. So called ‘ethical funds’ that only screen, but 
do not engage, have no impact on the world whatsoever, yet claim to be 
responsible investors. In any discussion of what is a responsible investor, 
the focus needs to be on the actual impacts on the ground of the actions 
of that investor, not on some notional assessment of whether the 
companies they hold happen to be more or less responsible companies. 
You can hold a portfolio of responsible companies in a large, liquid, 
relatively efficient market and make no difference to anything 
whatsoever. 
The problem of ‘greenwashing’ that these observations imply, was raised by 
other respondents in various forms. One respondent from the ‘other’ group felt 
that:  
RI products have become increasingly important to corporate entities 
involved in irresponsible and unsustainable activities. They are part of a 
complex web of drivers [that] have become more important as the 
entities understand more about their power. 
Another commentator from this group noted that part of the problem associated 
with RI’s capacity to drive genuine behaviour change arose largely from the: 
The principle, that fund trustees must first and foremost make a profit 
this year [which] makes them timid, concerned only for the short term. 
The system favours the status quo, rather than courageous leaps into 
‘riskier’ new areas, which we know we must invest in if this world is to 
be passed on in habitable form. 
One financial planner provided a contrast to his kind of ‘timid’ approach. A more 
‘activist’ institution, in their opinion, had a much greater capacity to change 
behaviour: 
RI institutions that are actively engaged in dialog with the companies in 
which they invest, and that use their power as shareholder to vote 
proxies and file proxy resolutions when necessary, can be very effective 
in changing the behaviour of corporations, in a 'trim-tab' sense. 
However, RI institutions can be much MORE effective when working in 
concert with NGOs, using the media to bring pressure to bear, and 




RI’s contribution to problem solving was the weakest of all three indicators 
associated with the implementation. Participants from across the survey groups 
did however point to specific examples where RI had made an important 
contribution to sustainable investment practices. Commercial property 
development was a good example. Many large property funds now had a focus 
on owing energy efficient buildings, which was pushing these assets up in value. 
The weight of this money was devaluing unsustainable property. Another 
respondent felt that many RI programmes actively contributing to the 
development of solutions to the problems of irresponsible and unsustainable 
development. Although some programmes were operating in the RI space 
because they had merely identified a new business opportunity, they were still 
acting as “change agents”, even if they did not (yet) understand the importance 
of their role. Other participants acknowledged the important role RI was playing 
in changing behaviour, but they were less optimistic about the real impact on the 
ground. 
As a general concluding observation, it is interesting to note that most 
stakeholder groups were fairly similar in the ratings they provided each of the 
individual indicators, with the exception of research-related participants, who 
were much more cautious, selecting ‘very low’ for equality (1.67), and ‘low’ for 
resources (2.00), accountability (2.00) and only rating transparency at 2.33. It is 
possible that the role of researcher affords these individuals a greater level of 
detachment, and possibly more objectivity, than other RI interests. In this case, it 
might be useful to pay more attention to the observations of this group in future 





Since UNCED, PC&I have become a primary means by which the effectiveness 
of sustainable development is evaluated in the field, and the basis for 
accreditation in the market. The advantage of the framework presented here for 
analysing ESG over existing methods of assessment, which emphasis single 
criteria (e.g. accountability), or emphasise only E, S, or G (or combinations 
thereof) is that it establishes a strong hierarchical logic between all the elements 
commonly identified as pertaining to the effective governance of sustainable 
development. The value of the PC&I approach to evaluation is that it also allows 
for the creation of standards that can serve as a reference for monitoring, 
assessment and reporting. It would be entirely possible to develop a standard out 
of the framework used in this study that could be applied to the practice of RI at 
the global, national and local levels. Such standards would bring the RI sector 
closer to realising its stated market objective to “identify, promote, and realise 
the adoption of best environmental and sustainability practice at all levels of 
financial institution operations” (UNEP FI undated, p. 3). As the world comes to 
grips with a range of global problems, and social political interactions 
increasingly shift to non-state contexts, governance standards are likely to 
become the main means by which legitimacy can be guaranteed. Such standards 
will make it easier for potential participants to determine whether they should 
engage in a given process or not. It will avoid the uncertainty that currently exists 
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